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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
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V.

)
)

MICHAEL PAUL ANDERSON,

)
)

Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________
)

NO. 39510
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2011-11344

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REVIE

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Michael Paul Anderson asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of
the Idaho Court of Appeals, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No.350 (Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2014)

(hereinafter, Opinion).

He submits that the Opinion, which affirmed his Judgment of

Conviction, was in conflict with previous decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals. The issue on appeal was whether the jury pool was tainted by a
potential juror's comments that he knew that Mr. Anderson had been incarcerated
"before." The district court's limiting instruction addressed only one of the two potential
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interpretations of that statement - that the defendant had been incarcerated on these
charges - but failed to address the other reasonable interpretation - that Mr. Anderson
had been incarcerated in a previous case. The Court of Appeals affirmed despite that
incomplete and insufficient limiting instruction based on its decision that the first
interpretation of the offending statement was more logical.

In so doing, it ignored

established precedent which requires courts to resolve potential questions about
whether the jury is potentially biased in favor of the defendant.
Furthermore,

the

Court of Appeals

applied

the wrong

standard when

assessing whether the objected-to error was harmless. The Court held that, because
Mr. Anderson had not shown a "devastating" effect from the juror's comments, there
was no prejudice, despite the fact that this Court has held that, when there is objectedto error, the State has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not
contribute to the verdict. Additionally, the Court of Appeals' conclusion that there was
no "devastating" effect ignores the district court's finding that the juror's comments were
of significant impact. The Court of Appeals' conclusion is also inconsistent with this
Court's and the United Supreme Court's precedent which indicates that the potential
loss of an impartial jury is a devastating effect. Because of the errors in the Court of
Appeals' opinion, this Court should exercise its review authority.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Anderson was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated assault.
(R., pp.96-98.) Count I alleged aggravated assault against Sherri Espinola and Count II
alleged aggravated assault against Gloria Benton. (R., p.27.) The jury also found that
Mr. Anderson used a deadly weapon in both offenses, which, because both counts
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arose from the same course of conduct, resulted in a sentencing enhancement (alleged
as Count Ill) applied to one of those convictions. (See, e.g., Tr., p.185, L.24

p.186,

L.20.) Ultimately, Mr. Anderson was sentenced to a unified term of five years, with one
year fixed, on Count I, and a concurrent ten-year unified sentence, with one year fixed,
on count II (which incorporated the enhancement in Count Ill), for an aggregate
sentence of ten years, with one year fixed. (R., p.103.)
After making its introductory remarks at Mr. Anderson's trial, the district court
opened the questioning of Mr. Anderson's potential jury by asking whether any of the
potential jurors had prior knowledge of the case.

(Supp. Tr., p.15, Ls.5-14.) 1 The

second potential juror to respond to that question, Juror #12, 2 said in front of the whole
panel, "I am an Ada County deputy sheriff.

I've been involved in the defendant's

incarceration .... I don't know anything about the case.

I've just - he's been in my

housing unit before." (Supp. Tr., p.16, Ls.15-17.) At that point, fourteen minutes into
the proceedings, defense counsel requested a sidebar, which was not transcribed.
(See Supp. Tr., p.17, Ls.1-4; R., p.51.) After that sidebar, the district court instructed
the jury that the fact that Mr. Anderson had been arrested could not be used as
evidence of guilt. (Supp. Tr., p.17, Ls.5-24.) The district court did not dismiss Juror #12
for cause at that time, nor did either party move on the record at that time for the court
to do so. (See generally Supp. Tr., pp.17-18.)

The supplemental volume of transcripts contains the voir dire of the jury, the
instructing of the jury, the opening and closing arguments of counsel, and the reading of
the verdict.
2 The prosecutor decided to refer to the jurors by number instead of name, and defense
counsel conformed to that procedure. (Supp. Tr., p.25, L.19 - p.26, L.1, p.91, L.17 p.92, L.23.)
1
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During the first recess taken by the district court, the parties made a record of
what occurred during the sidebar.

(See Supp. Tr., p.75, Ls.7-8.)

Defense counsel

indicated that he had moved for a mistrial based on Juror #12's comments because all
the potential juror had said was that Mr. Anderson had been incarcerated in the
potential juror's unit "before." (Supp. Tr., p.75, Ls.9-21.) The district court indicated that
it had denied the motion because it felt the jury was not unfairly tainted, as it interpreted
that comment to refer to the fact that Mr. Anderson had been incarcerated in relation to
the charged conduct in this case and the prosecutor indicated that he intended to
present evidence of that fact. (Supp. Tr., p. 75, L.22 - p. 76, L.10.) The district court also
stated that, while it intended to dismiss Juror #12 for cause, "I wait until after the
conclusion of voir dire to do that so we don't have a mass exodus when people figure
what it takes to get out of jury duty."

(Supp. Tr., p.76, L.11 - p.77, L.8.) Defense

counsel made some comments as to the propriety of that decision, given the fact that
additional questions might provoke a response from Juror #12, and the district court
indicated that it had decided to dismiss Juror #12 after the recess. (Tr., p.76, Ls.18-24,
p.77, Ls.19-21.) When asked if he objected to that procedure, the prosecutor stated
that he had intended to ask Juror #12 certain questions about police procedures in
order to educate the jury, and the district court responded: "You want to educate the
rest of the jury by questioning him, and you're going to find another way to educate
them. I don't want to have a mistrial, and I'm quite concerned that we might." (Supp.
Tr., p.78, Ls.10-22.) The district court did not immediately dismiss Juror #12 after the
break, but it ultimately did so, approximately one and one-half hours after the sidebar.
(Supp. Tr., p.79, L.1 - p.84, L.4; R., pp.51-52.)
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When it dismissed Juror #12, the district court interrupted the prosecutor's voir
dire of Juror #32, a former legal assistant of thirty years, who had stated in front of the

whole panel "I am very biased, very prejudiced .... I have no use for people with a
victim mentality.... I have no tolerance for people with a victim mentality." (Supp.
Tr., p.80, L.20 - p.81, L.81, p.83, L.25 - p.84, L.10 (the district court interrupting the voir
dire to dismiss Juror #12).) Juror #32 defined a "victim mentality" as "[w]on't or can't

take responsibility for their own actions or interactions.
fault."

(Supp. Tr., p.81, Ls.4-8.)

It's always somebody else's

The prosecutor followed up on that comment by

saying, "[There are] going to be some people who come in, and they are going to say,
'This thing happened.

I saw this, I heard this, I felt like this.'

The court may

occasionally call them victims because that's what the law calls them ... .'' (Supp.
Tr., p.81, Ls.10-15.)

Defense counsel objected, asserting that no determination had

been made as to whether any witnesses were "victims" and that was a matter on which
the district court should instruct the jury. (Supp. Tr., p.81, Ls.16-18.) The district court
took note of, but overruled the objection and stated, "I do my best to refer to them as
alleged victims, because that's what they are until the close of evidence."
Tr., p.81, Ls.19-25.)

(Supp.

However, it was not until approximately two hours later, when

reading the pre-proof jury instructions to the jury, that the district court clarified that the
term "victim":
is used only to refer to a person or persons who are alleged to have been
victimized, and is used only for convenience. It does not indicate any
opinion on my part that a person is a victim, or that the defendant has
committed an offense. Whether a person is a victim, and whether the
defendant is guilty of any offense, are matters for you alone to determine
based on the evidence presented at trial.
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(Tr., p.155, Ls.6-16; R. p.67; see R., p.52 (the minutes indicating the chronological gap
between defense counsel's objection and the reading of the pre-proof instructions).)
After the district court's initial commerit on the use of the term "victim," the prosecutor
resumed his voir dire of Juror #32 in regard to her definition of the term "victim
mentality," which resulted in the following exchange in the presence of the whole panel:
Q. You understand that Mr. Anderson has no duty to present a defense or

any evidence, okay? I have a duty to put on enough evidence to convince
all of you beyond a reasonable doubt that things happened that the judge
says have to happen before you can check the guilty box, right? If he
[Mr. Anderson] chooses to present evidence and it is evidence, or his
lawyer chooses to question the witnesses, the gist of which is, "Well, it
didn't happen that way," or, "You shouldn't believe him," or, "It happened,
but it doesn't mean what the state says it means," is that going to be a
victim mentality for you?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Well, you kind of understand that's the way the system works,
right?

A. I don't believe it's the way the system is meant to work.
Q. Okay.

A. It is the way it works unfortunately.

(Supp. Tr., p.82, L.16 - p.83, L.5.) Neither party moved to remove Juror #32 for cause. 3

(See generally Supp. Tr.; R., pp.51-53.) Ultimately, the jury was selected and sworn,
and the evidentiary presentation began.
The evidence as to the events which the State alleged qualified as aggravated
assault was only presented through the testimony of Gloria Benton and Sherri Espinola
and a video recording from a surveillance camera (identified as State's Exhibit 1).
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Juror #32 was not a member of the jury panel which heard the case. (Supp. Tr., p.6,
Ls.6-19.)
6

Ms. Benton and Ms. Espinola were working at a Rite-Aid store. (Tr., p.37, Ls.10-17.)
Mr. Anderson entered that store with the intent to purchase some beer.

(Tr., p.39,

L.16 - p.40, L.13.) As Mr. Anderson waited in the checkout line, an unidentified male
customer got into line behind him.
22:21 :47.)4

(See Tr., p.51, Ls.7-22; State's Exhibit 1 at

Ms. Benton was engaged in a relatively long checkout with another

customer. (Tr., p.40, Ls.6-18.) Mr. Anderson became agitated at the delay, and began
mumbling curses to himself. (Tr., p.41, Ls.1-6.)
At that same time, Ms. Espinola, the supervisor on duty that night, came over to
Ms. Benton's register to retrieve a pack of cigarettes for another customer. (Tr., p.41,
Ls.9-12, p.88, L. 17 - p.90, L.2, p.91, Ls.6-8.)

Ms. Espinola heard Mr. Anderson's

comments, which she considered to be belligerent, and so she intervened in the
situation. (Tr., p.91, Ls.8-10.) When she saw that Mr. Anderson intended to purchase
beer, she testified that she said, '"Clearly you must be intoxicated already,' because he
started swearing at me." (Tr., p.93, Ls.21-23.) Ms. Espinola decided she would not let
Mr. Anderson buy the beer and so moved the beer, which Mr. Anderson had placed on
the counter, away from him, asked Mr. Anderson to leave the store, and threatened to
call the police. (Tr., p.93, L.23 - p.94, L.2, p.42, Ls.2-9.) Mr. Anderson became more
agitated, and he stepped up to and past the register. 5

(See State's Exhibit 1 at

22:23:00.) As he did so, both Ms. Benton and Ms. Espinola testified that Mr. Anderson

State's Exhibit 1 simultaneously presents the recordings from multiple security
cameras. There is no audio. Display 5 is the recording of the camera overlooking the
register in question. It has a time and date stamp, which will be referenced to promote
clarity when referring to the video.
5 The customer upon whom Ms. Benton had been waiting had completed her
transaction and moved away from the counter as Ms. Espinola moved to intervene with
Mr. Anderson. (See State's Exhibit 1 at 22:23:00.)
4
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became upset to the point of yelling and cursing, raised his shirt, displayed the
sheathed knife concealed underneath, tapped the handle, and threatened them.
(Tr., p.42, L.15- p.44, L.9, p.95, L.10 - p.96, 15.)
After the State rested its case, defense counsel moved for a judgment of
acquittal for insufficient evidence, specifically asserting that the evidence had not
shown that the threat was imminent. (Tr., p.171, Ls.1-17.) The district court denied
that motion, finding that sufficient evidence had been presented for the jury to find
Mr. Anderson guilty, which the jury ultimately did. (Tr., p.173, Ls.1-10; R., pp.96-98.)
The district court imposed a five-year unified sentence, with one year fixed, for Count I,
and a ten-year unified sentence, with one year fixed, for Count 11, which included the
sentencing enhancement. (Tr., p.200, Ls.7-12; R., p.103.) The district court ordered
the sentences to be served concurrently and credited Mr. Anderson with 167 days of
pre-judgment incarceration.

(Tr., p.202, Ls.16-17; R., p.103.)

Mr. Anderson filed a

timely Notice of Appeal from the Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.108-10.)
On appeal, Mr. Anderson argued that the district court erred when it denied his
motion for a mistrial because, regardless of which interpretation of Juror #12's
comments the jurors adopted, they were prejudiced by those comments.
pp.9-13.)

(App. Br.,

He also argued that the limiting instruction the district court gave was

insufficient because it did not address one of the two potential interpretations of Juror
#12's comments. (See, e.g., Opinion, p.5 n.1.) However, the Court of Appeals affirmed
that the district court's decision to deny the motion for a mistrial, finding that there was
no error because Juror #12 was ultimately excused for cause and there was a limiting
instruction as to his comments. (Opinion, p.5.) It also concluded that there was no
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error in the limiting instruction's failure to address the second potential interpretation
because it "led the jury away" from that interpretation. (Opinion, p.5 n.1.) In any event,
it determined that any error was harmless because the Court of Appeals concluded that
Mr. Anderson had not shown a "devastating" continuing impact to his trial, and so, had
not shown prejudice. (Opinion, pp.5-8.) Mr. Anderson filed a timely petition for review
from that opinion.
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ISSUES
1.

Whether the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion affirming Mr. Anderson's Judgment
of Conviction is in conflict with previous decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court
and the Idaho Court Of Appeals and, as a result, unacceptably risks the
possibility that Mr. Anderson was not convicted by an impartial jury in violation of
his Constitutional rights.

2.

Whether the district court erred by not declaring a mistrial after the potential
jury pool was tainted by comments on Mr. Anderson's incarceration and by
comments on his guilt and ability to assert his innocence against the State's
evidence
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Opinion Affirming Mr. Anderson's Judgment Of Conviction
Is In Conflict With Previous Decisions Of The Idaho Supreme Court And The Idaho
Court Of Appeals And, As A Result, Unacceptably Risks The Possibility That
Mr. Anderson Was Not Convicted By An Impartial Jury In Violation Of His
Constitutional Rights

A

Standard For Evaluating Petitions For Review
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that petitions for review may be granted

only "when there are special and important reasons" for doing so but, ultimately, the
decision of whether to grant a given petition lies within the sound discretion of the
Supreme Court. I.A.R. 118(b). This exercise of discretion is not completely unfettered.
Rule 118(b) provides some factors which must be considered in evaluating any petition
for review, including:
1)

Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with precedent from
the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court; and

2)

Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own prior
decisions.

I.AR. 118(b). In this case, Mr. Anderson contends that there are special and important
reasons for review to be granted. Specifically, the Court of Appeals' analysis in regard
to the sufficiency of the limiting instruction given in light of the two potential
interpretations of Juror #12's comments is in contravention of Idaho Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals precedent. I.AR. 118(b)(2)-(3). Therefore, this Court should exercise
its review authority in this case.
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B.

Despite Established Precedent To The Contrary, The Court Of Appeals
Erroneously Concluded That The District Court's Incomplete Limiting Instruction,
Which Did Not Address One Of The Reasonable Interpretations Of Juror #12's
Comments, Was Appropriate
Juror #12 stated in front of the whole jury pool that Mr. Anderson has "been in my

housing unit before."

(Supp. Tr., p.16, Ls.15-23.)

There were two potential

interpretations of that statement - that Juror #12 was referring to some previous time
when Mr. Anderson was incarcerated for some other incident, or that Juror #12 was
referring to Mr. Anderson's incarceration related to this case. Both interpretations, as
will be discussed more fully infra, were improper and prejudicial.

The district court

issued a limiting instruction which only addressed one of the two interpretations - that
Mr. Anderson had been incarcerated in this case. (See Supp. Tr., p.17, Ls.5-18 (the
instruction as given to the jury); Supp. Tr. p. 75, L.15

p. 76, L.17 (record of defense

counsel's objection and argument and the district court's reason for overruling the
motion for mistrial).) On appeal, Mr. Anderson claimed that the district court erred by
not ordering a mistrial following Juror #12's statements, particularly since the limiting
instruction designed to address that issue was incomplete.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the limiting instruction was not erroneous,
and thus, that the decision to deny the mistrial was appropriate, because:
had the court addressed the comment as an inference of prior
incarceration, the court would have highlighted that inference rather than
the more logical inference that [Mr.] Anderson was incarcerated for the
presently charged offense .... Additionally, the district court's decision not
to highlight the second interpretation led the jury away from considering
Juror 12's comments as an inference that [Mr.] Anderson was
incarcerated for a prior offense.
(Opinion, p.5 n.1.) The Court of Appeals' conclusions in this regard are inconsistent
with precedent in several ways.
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First, its conclusion that one of the reasonable interpretations of that statement
was "more logical" than the other does not mean that all the jurors reached that same
conclusion. After all, the Court of Appeals did not find that the alternate interpretation
was unreasonable, just less logical. (See generally Opinion.) Indeed, it is difficult to
see how the Court of Appeals reached its conclusion that the logical interpretation of
"he's been in my housing unit before" (Supp. Tr., p.16, Ls.22-23) is "he's been in my
housing unit in relation to this case," (see Opinion, p.5 n.1 ), when the word "before"
means "at an earlier time : PREVIOUSLY."

MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY AND

THESAURUS, 67 (2007) (emphasis from original). Giving the word "before" its common
definition, the more logical interpretation of Juror #12's comments is that Mr. Anderson
was incarcerated previously, at some earlier time not associated with this offense.
Since the limiting instruction affirmed by the Court of Appeals failed to address a
reasonable interpretation of the prejudicial statement, the affirmation of that instruction
by the Court of Appeals means this Opinion is inconsistent with United States Supreme
Court precedent, Idaho Supreme Court precedent, and its own precedent.

For

example, the Court of Appeals has held that, when there is doubt about whether the jury
was impartial, those doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant (i.e., not disregarded,
as the Court of Appeals did in Mr. Anderson's case). State v. Hauser, 143 Idaho 603,
610 (Ct. App. 2006). "[A]ny justified doubt that a venireman can 'stand indifferent in a
cause' ought to be resolved in favor of the accused."

Id. (quoting Justus v.

Commonwealth, 266 S.E.2d 87, 90 (1980)) (emphasis added). After all, the point of voir
dire is to ensure that the jury which ultimately hears the case is impartial.
Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 85-89 (1988).
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The defendant has the right to an

impartial jury.

Id.; Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 365-66 (1966) ("[P]etitioner was

entitled to be tried by 12, not 9 or even 10, impartial and unprejudiced jurors.");

Nightengale v. Timmel, 151 Idaho 347, 353-54 (2011 ); State v. Ramos, 119 Idaho 568,
569-70 (1990). Therefore, if the panel is tainted, regardless of how it became tainted,
the defendant is entitled to a new trial. See Ross, 487 U.S. at 86-87; Hauser, 143 Idaho
at 610-11 (where a juror was potentially biased against the defendant, the defendant
was deprived of his right to an impartial jury). By not addressing the second reasonable
interpretation of Juror #12's comments, the Court of Appeals essentially ignored the
reasonable doubts about whether the jury was impartial, which is inconsistent with wellestablished precedent.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals' conclusion - that the district court's decision to
give an incomplete instruction, rather than highlight the second interpretation, was
justified - ignores the basic rules about jury instructions. For example, "[a] requested
jury instruction must be given when it is supported by any reasonable view of the
evidence."

Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 114 Idaho 547, 555 (2007) (emphasis

added). "'A trial court has the duty to properly instruct the jury on the law applicable to
the case before it."' Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co., 149 Idaho
299, 313 (2010) (quoting Sulik v. Central Valley Farms, Inc., 95 Idaho 826,828 (1974)).
One reasonable view of the evidence was that Juror #12 was referring to an
incarceration on a previous charge, and therefore, the district court needed to give an
instruction addressing that interpretaion, regardless of the Court of Appeals' own
thoughts about the benefits of highlighting, as opposed to burying, that interpretation.
The Court of Appeals relied on the general principle that jurors will follow the
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instructions given to support its determination that the incomplete limiting instruction
was sufficient, on the idea that, if the district court highlights one interpretation of Juror
#12's comments, the jurors will adopt that same interpretation. (Opinion, pp.5-6.) That
position is inconsistent with this Court's precedent, which holds that "a mistrial should
ordinarily be ordered rather than for the court to rely on a cautionary instruction to the
jury," and failure to not order the mistrial may be error. State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506,
510 (1978); see also State v. Harrison, 136 Idaho 504, 506 (Ct. App. 2001). That is
particularly true here, where the Court of Appeals' own precedent requires it to resolve
questions in that regard in the defendant's favor. Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610.
Furthermore, defense counsel expressed his concerns with the completeness of
the instruction given: "he [Juror #12] specifically said 'before'; he didn't say with this
incident. For that reason, I move for a mistrial." (Supp. Tr., p.75, Ls.18-21.) In so
arguing, defense counsel expressed his desire to have the second interpretation
addressed before the jury, and therefore, an instruction in that regard was merited, or
else the mistrial should have been granted.

Therefore, regardless of the Court of

Appeals' beliefs about highlighting the issue, the district court's incomplete limiting
instruction did not properly instruct the jury as to the relevant law, and thus, was
insufficient to remedy the prejudice caused by Juror #12's comments. See Vandetiord

Co., 114 Idaho at 555 (holding that a requested instruction supported by any reasonable
view of the evidence must be given). Therefore, its decision to affirm the denial of the
motion for mistrial was erroneous.
Finally, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no "devastating" or
continuing effect caused by this comment, and thus, no prejudice, even though an
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improper and prejudicial comment was insufficiently addressed by the district court.
(See Opinion, pp.5-6.) First, that fails to apply the proper standard of review to an
objected-to error. Second, the requirement that the error have a "devastating" impact is
inconsistent with this Court's precedent. Finally, the continuing impact of Juror #12's
comments was devastating.
First, this Court recently reaffirmed the proper standard of review for objected-to
error: if the appellant established error, the State has the burden to prove the error
harmless, which means "the State must 'prove [ ] 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."" State v. Joy, 155 Idaho
1, 12 (2013) (quoting State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,222 (2010) (quoting Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967))).

Since the second interpretation of Juror #12's

comments was reasonable, it was error to not grant a mistrial, particularly since the
limiting instruction did not address that interpretation. The State did not prove that the
error - allowing the trial to proceed after that comment without a sufficient limiting
instruction on that point - did not contribute to the verdict, since it left open the very real
possibility that some of the jurors were not impartial. Since the Court of Appeals did not
apply the proper standard of review, this Court should exercise its review authority in
this case.
Second, this Court has not required a "devastating" impact in regard to a motion
for a mistrial. See, e.g., State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571-72 (2007). Rather, "'our
focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that triggered the mistrial
motion."' Id. at 571 (quoting State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 912 (2003)). As
such, the Court of Appeals' focus on the need for a devastating impact is inconsistent
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with this Court's precedent. In fact, the district court's comments about the impact of
Juror #12's statements reveal that they had a continuing impact on the trial. (Tr., p.78,
Ls.18-22 (when discussing when to remove Juror #12 for cause, the district court
stated, "I don't want to have a mistrial, and I'm quite concerned that we might").)
Finally, even if there needs to be a "devastating" impact, the required showing is
that there be "a strong likelihood that the effect of the [error] would be 'devastating' to
the defendant."' State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 631 (Ct. App. 2004) (emphasis added)
(quoting Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8) (1987)). This Court and the United
States Supreme Court have both consistently held that situations such as this give rise
to an unacceptable risk that the defendant was not convicted by an impartial jury, a right
guaranteed by the Constitution. See, e.g., Ross, 487 U.S. at 85-89; Parker, 385 U.S.
at 365-66; Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 353-54; Ramos, 119 Idaho at 569-70.

The

deprivation of a constitutionally-guaranteed right is surely a "devastating" consequence
of the error, particularly when the attempt to remedy the error does not actually address
part of the error. Therefore, there is a strong likelihood that the effect of the error would
be devastating to Mr. Anderson. As such, the Court of Appeals' analysis as to whether
this error was harmless is wholly improper and contradictory to established precedent.
Therefore, since the Court of Appeals' Opinion in this case is inconsistent with
this Court's precedent, as well as its own precedent, this Court should grant review in
this case.
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11.
The District Court Erred By Not Declaring A Mistrial After The Potential Jury Pool Was
Tainted By Comments On Mr. Anderson's Incarceration And By Comments On His Guilt
And Ability To Assert His Innocence Against The State's Evidence
A.

Introduction
The jury pool was initially tainted, necessitating a mistrial, when the second

response to the district court's first question to the panel, offered by an Ada County
sheriff's deputy, informed the pool that Mr. Anderson had been incarcerated "before."
Whether the potential jurors interpreted that as "Mr. Anderson has been incarcerated on
this charge since the events at issue" or "Mr. Anderson has been convicted and
incarcerated in the past," that comment was prejudicial and should have resulted in a
mistrial. Regardless of which interpretation the jurors adopted, that statement unduly
prejudiced the jury pool against Mr. Anderson.
Assuming, arguendo, that comment alone was insufficient to justify a mistrial,
subsequent comments on Mr. Anderson's guilt and ability to challenge the State's
evidence, compounded the error to the point that a mistrial should have been declared.
First, one juror, formerly a legal assistant in a law firm, essentially told the panel that the
system was not intended to allow the defense to assert his innocence and challenge
the evidence presented by the State or otherwise show the State's interpretation of that
evidence was flawed; that was just the guilty defendant having a victim mentality,
refusing to accept responsibility for his actions.

Second, the district court told the

potential jury pool that Ms. Benton and Ms. Espinola had to be referred to as "alleged
victims" until the close of evidence, implying that, at that point, they would be shown to
be true victims. The district court was aware how substantially the potential jurors had
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been prejudiced by the first juror's comment, and so by not declaring a mistrial after
these subsequent, prejudicial comments, it erroneously proceeded with the trial. In light
of the prejudice recognized by the district court, there is reasonable doubt that the
prejudice from that comment influenced the jury's decision.

B.

Juror #12's Comments, Which Informed The Jury Pool That Mr. Anderson Had
Been Incarcerated "Before" Unduly Prejudiced The Jury Pool, And The District
Court Erred By Denying Defense Counsel's Motion For A Mistrial
The United States Constitution guarantees the defendant's right to a fair and

impartial jury. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI; see, e.g., United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S.
506, 509-10 (1995).

Those protections are incorporated against the states via the

Fourteenth Amendment. Parker, 385 U.S. at 364; State v. Needs, 99 Idaho 883, 890
n.4 (1979). The Idaho Constitution affords similar protections. Idaho Const. art. I,§§ 7,
13; see, e.g., State v. Paz, 118 Idaho 542, 547 (1990) overruled by State v. Card, 121
Idaho 425 (1991 ). Idaho has also enacted statutes and court rules to protect this right.
See, e.g., Idaho Code Ann.§ 19-1902, -2019, -2020; I.C.R. 24(b).
Idaho's appellate courts effectively review denials of motions for mistrial de novo.
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007).

[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably
exercised his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the
mistrial motion was made. Rather, the question must be whether the
event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented reversible
error when viewed in the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion
for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the "abuse of discretion"
standard is a misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is one of
reversible error. Our focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the
incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to
declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed
retrospectively, constituted reversible error.
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Id.

(quoting

State

v.

Sandoval-Tena,

138

Idaho

908,

912

(2003)

(quoting

State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho 54, 57 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting State v. Urquhart, 105
Idaho 92, 95 (Ct. App. 1983)))). Additionally, the appellate courts first determine if there
was error, then decide whether it was harmless. Id.
As to the first interpretation of Juror #12's statements - that Mr. Anderson was
incarcerated on the underlying charges - references to the fact that a defendant has
been or remains jailed on the charged offense are inappropriate and prejudicial.
State v. Harrison, 136 Idaho 504, 506-07 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing Estelle

v. Williams, 425

U.S. 501, 512 (1976) (holding that requiring the defendant to appear at trial in prison
garb prejudiced the jury because it created "an unacceptable risk ... of impermissible
factors coming into play"); State v. Tucker, 226 Conn. 618 (1993) (informing the jury that
the defendant is in jail creates an improper inference of guilt); Haywood
Nev. 285 (1991) (same); State

v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176 (1993) overruled by State v.

Fortin, 178 N.J. 540 (2004); State
(same); State

v. State, 107

v. Childs, 204 N.J. Super. 639 (App. Div. 1985)

v. Martinez, 624 A.2d 291 (R.I. 1993) (same)).

As to the second interpretation - that Mr. Anderson was incarcerated on some
prior conviction - references to prior convictions are inadmissible except in certain,
limited circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009). The evidence
of prior crimes must be relevant to a material and disputed issue in the crime charged. 6
Id.

6

In this case, to be admissible, the prior convictions would have to be relevant to
whether Mr. Anderson actually did threaten either Ms. Benton or Ms. Espinola with
imminent harm in order to be relevant to a material and disputed issue of the crime
charged. See Grist, 147 Idaho at 52. The elements of that offense, and thus the
material issues therein, are discussed in depth in Section 11(8), supra. Any prior
20

The prejudicial effect of such testimony is that it induces the jury to
believe the accused is more likely to have committed the crime on trial
because he is a man of criminal character. It, therefore, takes the
jury away from their primary consideration of [the defendant's] guilt or
innocence of the particular crime on trial.
State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510 (1978). As such, regardless of which of the two

interpretations the potential jurors adopted, those comments on Mr. Anderson's
incarceration were prejudicial and erroneous. Thus, the only question is whether the
error was harmless, which it was not.
When there is error, if the appellate court is able to determine '"beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained,"' then the error is harmless. Joy, 155 Idaho at 12 (quoting Perry, 150 Idaho at
221) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967))). While the comment on
incarceration itself does not always require a new trial, see Harrison, 136 Idaho at
506-07, the timing of the comment is critical. In this case, there is reasonable doubt
about whether those comments contributed to the conviction, making them not
harmless.
Juror #12, a corrections officer working at the jail, made his comments in
response to the district court's first question on voir dire. (Tr., p.15, L.5 - p.16, L.25.)
That means that, essentially from the outset of the trial proceedings, the potential jurors

incarceration has not been alleged as related to those material issues, nor would an
offer of proof make such a demonstration. Therefore, incarceration for ~ prior crime,
if any, is not relevant to the material and disputed issues of the offense charged.
See Grist, 147 Idaho at 52. Prior convictions may also be used to impeach a witness.
See, e.g., State v. Pierce, 107 Idaho 96, 102-03 (Ct. App. 1984). However, it is
impermissible to impeach a witness before they have testified. Van Brunt v. Stoddard,
136 Idaho 681, 685 (2001 ). As Mr. Anderson did not testify in this case, prior
convictions could not be used impeach his truthfulness. Id. Thus, there is no exception
under which prior convictions would be relevant in this case.
21

knew that Mr. Anderson had been incarcerated, and thus, from the outset of the trial
proceedings, had it in their minds that Mr. Anderson was of a criminal disposition, with
the implication that he was guilty of the offense on trial. See Harrison, 136 Idaho at
506; Wrenn, 99 Idaho at 510. Furthermore, because Juror #12 was not dismissed for
cause at that time, the potential jurors had it in their minds that such information or
mindset was not particularly troubling in terms of impartiality or bias. Instead, the entire
trial proceeding began with an inappropriate comment on guilt and proceeded with that
undertone.
In fact, the district court recognized just how prejudicial that comment was. In
deciding whether to dismiss Juror #12 for cause, the prosecutor requested the district
court not exercise that discretion because he wanted to question Juror #12 about police
response procedures. (Tr., p.78, Ls.10-17.) The district court responded: "You want to
educate the rest of the jury by questioning him, and you're going to find another way to
educate them. I don't want to have a mistrial, and I'm quite concerned that we might."
(Tr., p.78, Ls.18-22 (emphasis added).) By the district court's own admission, Juror
#12's comments had pushed the case to the line of whether a mistrial was necessary. It
cannot be said, particularly in light of the district court's comment, that there is no
reasonable doubt that the prejudice from that comment did not influence the jury's
decision.
The only reason the district court did not grant the motion for a mistrial was that it
had given what it felt to be a sufficient limiting instruction. (Tr., p.75, L.22 - p.76, L.10,
p.17, Ls.5-18.)

That did not, however, alleviate the undertone that permeated the

proceedings from that point forward: that Mr. Anderson was in jail, and thus more likely
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to be guilty. See Harrison, 136 Idaho at 506; Wrenn, 99 Idaho at 510. Additionally, the
fact that Juror #12 was not immediately dismissed for cause indicated to the jury that his
comments were not overly problematic. 7 As a result, other potential jurors may have
been induced not to speak up, even though they may have had underlying biases
against Mr. Anderson.

After all, if one of the officers who oversees Mr. Anderson's

incarceration is allowed to remain in the jury pool, why should their own biases as to
guilt be more problematic than Juror #12's? Accordingly, even though the defense still
had an opportunity for individual voir dire after Juror #12's comments, that voir dire may
have been wholly ineffective at guaranteeing an impartial jury since the jurors had been
misled as to what it means to be truly impartial.
In fact, because the comment was made so early in the proceedings, fourteen
minutes in, to be precise (R., p.51 ), the district court should have been more compelled
to simply start with a fresh jury pool, rather than continue with a tainted jury pool. As
such, because Juror #12's comments tainted the jury pool, the district court erred in not
ordering a mistrial following his comments.
Comments such as those made by Juror #12 have a continuing impact on the
jury's thought processes.

See, e.g., Harrison, 136 Idaho at 506-07 (quoting Estelle,

425 U.S. at 512) (holding that information revealed to the jury about a defendant's

The district court's rationale for not immediately removing Juror #12 for cause was
"I wait until after the conclusion of voir dire to [excuse jurors for cause] so we don't have
a mass exodus when people figure what it takes to get out of jury duty." (Tr., p.77,
Ls.5-8.) With this statement, the district court acknowledged that the decision of
whether to dismiss a potential juror for cause sends implicit messages to the jury pool.
Therefore, just as the potential jurors may get the message that by expressing certain
opinions, they may be excused from the jury, they may also get the message that, when
a juror expresses a concern about a potential bias and is not excused, that bias is not
problematic for a juror to have.
7
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status as an inmate created "an unacceptable risk ... of impermissible factors coming
into play"). In fact, in this case, the district court acknowledged that those comments
had a continuing impact: "You [the prosecutor] want to educate the rest of the jury by
questioning [Juror #12], and you're going to find another way to educate them. I don't
want to have a mistrial, and I'm quite concerned that we might." (Supp. Tr., p.78, Ls.10-

22 (emphasis added).) Additionally, Juror #12's comments were some of the first made
by any of the potential jurors, only fourteen minutes into the trial proceedings, and were
made before any comment by the prosecutor as to the fact that Mr. Anderson had, at
any time, been arrested in relation to the alleged offense.
p.16, L.23; R., p.51.)

(See Supp. Tr., p.6, L.10 -

Therefore, their impact, as the district court indicated, was

significant because, from the outset, the jurors were aware that Mr. Anderson has
served time in jail, and knowing that information prejudiced the jurors. See Harrison,
136 Idaho at 506-07.
Furthermore, the fact that Juror #12 was not immediately excused for cause
reinforces the impact his comments had on the jury pool. This is more than a claim that
Juror #12 should have been immediately removed from the jury pool. (Compare Resp.
Br., p.10 ("[l]t is predicated on a remedy he did not request below.").) Even if Juror #12
had been immediately removed for cause, there would still be a question about whether
his comments irrevocably tainted the jury pool.

Rather, Mr. Anderson's argument

focuses on the implicit message that not excusing Juror #12 would have sent to the
other jurors: that the information Juror #12 knew about Mr. Anderson's criminal history
was not overly concerning to the district court, and so the other jurors would have
viewed their own biases as similarly insignificant, and thus, remained silent about those
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biases during the voir dire process. The district court's comments when it decided to
ultimately dismiss Juror #12 reveal that this sort of message existed in this case. (See
Supp. Tr., p.78, Ls.10-22.)
Therefore, since Mr. Anderson has demonstrated that Juror #12's comments
inappropriately tainted the jury, or at least risked tainting the jury, regardless of how the
jury understood those comments, the district court's decision to deny the mistrial was
erroneous. See, e.g., Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610.

C.

The Prejudice Caused By Juror #12's Comments Is Magnified When Considered
Alongside The Comments By Juror #32 Regarding Mr. Anderson's Guilt And
Ability To Assert His Innocence, Mr. Anderson Is Entitled To A Mistrial Because
His Jury Was lmpermissibly Prejudiced
Two

comments

subsequent

to

Juror #12's

prejudicial

remarks

further

demonstrate that the jury pool was tainted and a mistrial should have been ordered.
First, Juror #32, a former legal assistant with thirty years of experience, made a rather
concerning statement about how the trial process should work after declaring herself to
be "very biased":
Q. Can you let go of your former life and just accept the role as a juror if

you are selected here?
A. I don't know. I'm very biased, very prejudiced.
Q. Okay. For or against who?

A. I have no use for people with a victim mentality.
Q. I'm sorry.

I can't hear the juror, the answer.

A. I have no tolerance for people with a victim mentality.
Q. Can you tell me what a victim mentality is?

25

A. Won't or can't take responsibility for their own actions or interactions.
It's always somebody else's fault.
(Supp. Tr., p.80, L.17 - p.81, L.8.) The prosecutor subsequently returned to this issue,
and Juror #32 added to her prior statements:
Q. You understand that Mr. Anderson has no duty to present a defense or

any evidence, okay? ... If he chooses to question the witnesses, the gist
of which is, "Well, it didn't happen that way," or, "You shouldn't believe
him," or, "It happened, but it doesn't mean what the state says it means,"
is that going to be a victim mentality for you?

A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Well, you kind of understand that's the way the system works,
right?

A. / don't believe it's the way the system is meant to work.
Q. Okay.

A. It's the way it works unfortunately.
(Supp. Tr., p.82, L.16 - p.83, 5 (emphasis added).) Juror #32, a person with thirty years
of experience working in the legal field, told the panel that the system was not designed
to allow the defendant to assert his innocence or challenge the evidence presented by
the State, and it is "unfortunate" that the defendant is allowed to maintain his innocence
against the State's evidence.

There was no limiting instruction issued following this

troublesome and prejudicial expression regarding the legal system and the defendant's
ability to maintain his innocence. (See generally Tr.)
And while there was no contemporaneous objection, the appellate courts review
a motion for mistrial, such as the one made after Juror #12's prejudicial comments, in
light of the entire record.

Field, 144 Idaho at 571.

Instead of looking just at the

propriety of the district court's actions in regard to the circumstances giving rise to the
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objection in isolation, the appellate court must consider the continuing impact on the
trial. Id. Thus, where, as here, the jury pool was subjected to prejudice by first one,
then another juror's comments, the appellate court should vacate the conviction and
remand for a new trial because of the aggregated prejudice, even though the motion for
a mistrial may not be renewed. See id. In this case, where Juror #12's comments had
already pushed the case to the limit of prejudice that could be withstood without
declaring a mistrial (see Tr., p. 78, Ls.18-22), Juror #32's highly-prejudicial comments,
which is not only a repudiation of the presumption of innocence, but an affirmation that if
Mr. Anderson asserts his against the State's evidence, that is actually more evidence
of guilt, pushed the issue over the edge.
Critically, Juror #32's comments were a blatant misstatement of the law, as the
defendant has a right to challenge or rebut the State's evidence. See, e.g., U.S. CONST.
amend VI (the defendant has the right to confront the witnesses against him).
Furthermore, Juror #32 was never dismissed for cause.

(See R., pp.51-52; see

generally Tr.) That would convey to the other members of the jury pool that such a bias
as Juror #32 expressed was acceptable and perhaps need not be brought up during

voir dire.

Thus, the potential jurors were left to believe a major (and uncorrected)

misstatement regarding the trial process and even though the defense still had an
opportunity for individual voir dire, that voir dire may have been wholly ineffective at
guaranteeing an impartial jury since the jurors had been misled as to what it means to
be truly impartial.
To make matters worse, Juror #32's comments followed immediately after
misstatements by the prosecutor and district court which presented as a comment on
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guilt. In trying to clarify what Juror #32 meant by "victim mentality," the prosecutor said
"[There are] going to be some people who come in, and they're going to say, 'This thing
happened. I saw this, I heard this, I felt this.' The court may occasionally call them
victims because that's what the law calls them, but .... " (Tr., p.81, Ls.10-15.) Defense
counsel objected and the district court responded, saying: "I do my best to refer to them
as alleged victims, because that's what they are until the close of evidence." (Tr., p.81,
Ls.22-23.) The natural implication from that statement is that, once the evidence period
closes, then we can refer to them as actual victims, as opposed to '.'alleged" victims
because the evidence will. show that they were actually victimized by the defendant.
(See Tr., p.81, Ls.22-23.)

This is particularly problematic in this case, because Mr. Anderson was charged
with aggravated assault by making threats.

(R., pp.26-27.)

For the district court to

imply that, at the end of the evidentiary presentation, the evidence would show the two
witnesses had been victimized (i.e., threatened) by the defendant, and thus could be
referred to as "victims," implies that Mr. Anderson would be shown guilty at the end of
the evidentiary presentation.

Such comments on guilt are impermissible. See, e.g.,

State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007).

And while the district court did

eventually instruct the jury in regard to the use of the term "victim" {Tr., p.155, Ls.6-16;
R., p.67), that instruction came nearly two hours after the improper comments
(R., pp.52-53). As such, the damage was done. The prosecutor's and district court's
implications that Mr. Anderson would be guilty after the evidentiary presentation ended
had the opportunity to settle into the jurors' minds before any corrective efforts were
taken. Additionally, since Juror #32 was not dismissed for cause at that point, other
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jurors could have received the impression that such perspectives were not overly
problematic or worth mentioning during the remainder of the voir dire process, further
depriving Mr. Anderson of a fair and impartial jury.
The point of voir dire is to ensure that the jury which ultimately hears the case is
impartial. Ross, 487 U.S. at 85-89. The defendant has the right to an impartial jury.
Id.; Parker, 385 U.S. at 365-66; Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 353-54; Ramos, 119 Idaho
at 569-70. Therefore, if the panel is tainted, regardless of how it became tainted, the
defendant is entitled to a new trial. See Ross, 487 U.S. at 86-87; Hauser, 143 Idaho at
610-11 (where a juror was potentially biased against the defendant, the defendant was
deprived of his right to an impartial jury). Field is consistent with this precedent. It does
not require the single comment by Juror #12 to be the basis of the other taints to the
jury pool; it requires this Court to examine the panel for bias, and if bias is present from
the conglomeration of improper comments during voir dire, then the district court's
decision to deny the motion for a mistrial was in error and should be reversed. Field,
144 Idaho at 571. The point is that, where the jury that sat on the case is biased, the
defendant is entitled to a new trial. Ross, 487 U.S. at 86-87. The difference is in how
the objection was preseNed. Compare Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 353-54 (preseNing
the challenge to the jury by moving to strike a biased juror for cause, ultimately striking
that juror with a peremptory challenge, and exercising all remaining peremptory
challenges), with Field, 144 Idaho at 571 (preseNing the challenge to the jury by moving
for a mistrial after the information was presented to the jury which had been excluded in
a motion in limine). If the prejudice caused by Juror #12's comments, when added to the
prejudice caused by Juror #32's comments, reveals that the panel was tainted, then the
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decision to deny the motion for a mistrial based on Juror #12's comments was in error.

See Ross, 487 U.S. at 85-89.
In this case, a review of the whole record reveals that Juror #12's comments did
impermissibly prejudice the jurors who deliberated in Mr. Anderson's case. That is
because the whole record also contains the troublesome comments made by Juror #32.
Since Juror #12's comments had at least pushed the case to the brink of a mistrial by
themselves (see Supp. Tr., p.78, Ls.10-22), the added impact of Juror #32's comments
reveals that the jury could not have been impartial. This is particularly true since the
district court did not instruct the jury as to the impropriety of Juror #32's views. In this
same regard, Juror #32 was not dismissed for cause. (See generally Supp. Tr., pp.6144.) The district court admitted that implicit messages about whether such biases
preclude service on the jury are sent when a juror was or was not dismissed for cause.
(Supp. Tr., p.76, L.11-p.77, L.8.)

Therefore, the fact that Juror #32 made those

prejudicial comments means that the jurors who sat on Mr. Anderson's jury received the
message that those perspectives are not overly problematic and thus, are not worth
mentioning.
Therefore, an examination of the whole record reveals that the district court erred
by not ordering a mistrial. See Field, 144 Idaho at 571; Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610-11.
As a result, this Court should reverse the district court's decision to not declare a
mistrial based on the fact that the jury pool was tainted, thereby depriving Mr. Anderson
of his right to an impartial jury. See id.; see also Parker, 385 U.S. at 365-66; Hauser,
143 Idaho 603, 610-11.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Anderson respectfully requests that this Court grant review in this case. On
review, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions and remand this
case for a new trial.
DATED this 26 th day of March, 2014.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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